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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MARY RAMIREZ,

Appellant,
vs.
OGDEN CITY, a municipal corporation
of the State of Utah,
Respondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Inasmuch as appellant's statement of facts omits
substantially all of the uncontroverted facts on which
the Trial Court very properly based its judgment, the
respondent is compelled to amplify the statement. Also,
because the appellant's statement is not in chronological
order and in some important aspects is highly formalized and requires reference to the record for completeness, it has occurred to the respondent that a chronological narrative statement of the facts might be of
some assistance to the Court. For this reason and because the facts are relatively brief the respondent
ventures upon a restatement of the facts even at the
risk of some repetition.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The record con1es to this Court in three independent
parts, each part separately paged. For the purpose of
differentiating we shall refer in our stateineit to the
Clerk's files of the pleadings, interrogatories and answers, etc., as the "Record" abbreviated as "R". The
reports "Transcript of Proceedings" will be referred'
to as the "Transcript" (T); and the deposition of the
plaintiff-appellant as the "Deposition" (Dep.).
In this action the appellant sued the respondent cit)r
for personal injuries received when appellant's rayon net
dress caught fire when it brushed against a hot stove in
the "Ladies Powder Ro01n" of the Ogden Community
Center, a public recreational facility maintained h:·
Ogden City. The controlling facts were stipulated at a
pre-trial conference upon which the pre-trial order was
based and at a subsequent further pre-trial conference
held by stipulation and it was agreed by the parties that a
law question only was presented to the Court for
decision. (T. 4) The matter was submitted to the Court
upon the agreed and uncontroverted facts and the
Court then entered judgment for the respondent city,
no cause of action upon the ground that under the facts
it appeared as a matter of law that the defendant city
opera ted the premises involved as a governmental function for public recreation and was therefore not liable
for negligence or nuisance, if any, committed or maintained by its agents or servants in the premises. (R. 038039) This appeal is from that judgment.
It must be noted that the appellant propounded
interrogatories to the respondent city, which so far as
competent were ans-wered under oath. (R. 014; 019) It
was stipulated that the facts stated in the answers were
2
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not challenged by the appellant and might be considered
as a part of the basis for any motion for judgment made
by respondent. (T. 4-5) Similarly, the appellant's
deposition was submitted in evidence as a pre-trial exhibit. (T. 5) The facts as stipulated or admitted to be
unchallenged are briefly outlined as follows:
Ogden City is a l-.1 unicipal Corporation of the State
of Utah. (R. 030) The City acquired the premises in
question on October 4, 1939, by deeds from Weber
County which provide that the property "is to be used
exclusively as a community recreational center." During
the war the buildings (which were surplus Army bar. racks placed thereon by the Army) were operated by
the U. S. 0. as a recreational center for Negro troops.
Under date of November 20, 1944, the City leased the
premises to the U. S. 0. for a term to end six (6) months
after the cessation of hostility with Germany. (R. 019)
The premises were surrendered by the U. S. 0. in the
late Summer or Fall of 1946. At about that time a
mass meeting of the inhabitants of Ogden interested in
the operation of the center as a public recreational
facility was convened and elected a "Board of Directors"
for the Center and City Commissioner Thomas East
designated certain other citizens to act as "advisors"
to this unofficial board of directors. To this board of
directors there was entrusted the active direction and
management of the Community Center as a publis recreational facility. In so acting Connnissioner East had
no authority from the Ogden City Board of Commissioners. (R. 031; 022-024). rrhis board voluntarily assumed to assist and direct the operation of the Center
as a public service rendered without obligation for the

3
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benefit of the inhabitants of Ogden City. It had no
legal authority, but directed the Director of the Center
and its affairs only by common consent. No instructions
as to the management WP.re given to the board by anyone. This situation continued up to the time of the
accident involved. (Ibid.)
Except during the period when the Community
Center was leased to the U. S. 0. it has always been
operated "as a public recreational center, and all persons
have had full leave and license to use the same at their
wish and convenience as a public park or recreational
facility, and the same has never been closed to anyone."
(R. 020-021) The Center was available at all times to
all of the people, who were free to go and use it whenever they wanted to do so, and the appellant understood
that she was free to use the facilities there. (Dep. 20-21)
From September 3, 1946 to November 1, 1946, the
"snack bar" concession was granted by the City to a
third party for a monthly consideration of One Hundred
One and 00j100 Dollars (101.00). Thereafter the snack
bar concession was granted to another person for a
consideration of Fifty and 00j100 Dollars ($50.00) per
month, but this relationship was terminated prior to
the year 1948. ( R. 031-032)
Beginning sometime prior to 1948 the City received
no revenue whatsover from the operation of the Center,
as disclosed by the financial statement of the City's
Director of Finance (Exhibit 1) which was stipulated
to be a correct statement. (R. 031) It is most important
to note that the City charged nothing and received
nothing for the use of the Center which was available
4
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to the public generally for use without charge as a
public recreational facility. At the same time the City
was spending some $5,963.30 to $7,349.63 annually out
of public taxes to Inaintain the premises as a public recreational facility. (R. 024; 031-032) There is absolutely
nothing in the record anywhere to indicate that the City
operated the Center as a business or for profit or in
competition ·with any private business whatsoever or
that it could possibly have been operated in the same
manner by any private enterprise. Nor is there any
evidence either admitted or proffered that the City
leased the premises (and particularly the "powder
room", where the accident occurred) to the Havana Club
or to anyone else. It is true that the Director of Recreation at the Center granted that club permission to give
a public dance on another part of the premises and that
she received Fifteen and 00 j100 Dollars ( $15.00) from
the club which she noted as "hall rental", but (1) this
was entirely outside of her duties as a director of recreation, which were confined to the direction of recreational activity at the Community Center (R. 031);
(2) the arrangement was neither authorized nor ratified
by the City Commission, which alone has legal power
to lease public property; ( 3) the money was never
received by the City nor was any report thereof made
to any city official until report was made in response
to inquiry in the course of the investigation of appellant's claim; ( 4) the money was directly expended for
recreational items under the general direction of the
unofficial board of directors, and ( 5) the arrangement
did not in any way affect the status or the powder room
in which the accident occurred, which was in another

5
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wing of the building~ and was as always open to all
female members of the general public. (R. 022-026; R.
024A; 031-032; Exhibit 1; Exhibit 4)
Moreover, there is nothing in the record to show that
any attempt was made to grant the Havana Club the exclusive use of any portion of the Community Center or
that any meinber of the public desiring access to any part
of the Center would or could have been excluded therefrom. It is true also that the Havana Club charged those
who participated in its public dance 75c per person, but,
of course, liability on the City cannot be predicated on
charges made by the Havana Club. It is also true that
the Havana Club had contributed to the Director on three
previous occasions during a five months period in connection with its use of a portion of the Center for a dance.
On the other hand the City was expending monthly a sum
in excess of $575.00 for the maintenance and operation
of the Center as a part of its public parks and recreational system. (Exhibit 1)
The sums paid or contributed by the Havana Club
to the Director, as well as other donations and the proceeds of other charita:ble fund raising activities conducted
under the direction of the unofficial Board of Directors
as shown by Exhibit 4, were expended largely for miscellaneous recreational items such as dominoes, ping pong
sets, checkers, etc., which were n1ade available for use by
the public at the Center without charge of any kind.
(T. 12-13)
On the night of the accident the appellant came to
the Community Center, intending to attend the dance
which was to be held in the south wing of the Center by
6
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the Havana Club. She went directly to the powder room
situated in the north wing and there the accident occurred. It is not contended that she or anyone else was ever
charged for the use of the powder room or that its use
was restricted to patrons of the dance sponsored by the
Havana Club.
At the further pre-trial hearing held at the time
originally set for the trial the appellant conceded that she
had no evidence to submit in addition to that already
in the record in connection with the pre-trial to show that
the City was engaged in a proprietary function and it
was upon this record that the motion of the defendant
City for no cause of action and for dismissal with prejudice was granted.

RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1.
IN OWNING, MAINTAINING AND OPERATING THE WALL A VENUE COMMUNITY
CENTER THE RESPONDENT CITY WAS
FULFILLING A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IN PROVIDING RECREATIONAL
FACILITIES, AND IS NOT LIABLE FOR
APPELLANT'S I N JURI E S SUFFERED
THEREIN.
POINT 2.
THE CITY DID NOT LEASE THE PREMISES
TO ANYONE.
POINT 3.
EVEN IF THE CITY HAD LEASED THE
PREMISES, STILL IT IS NOT LIABLE, AS
IT WAS, NEVER.THELESS, FULFILLING A
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION.
7
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POINT 4.
THE CITY \YAS XOT FULFILLING A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION AS TO APPELLANT.
POINT 5.
THE AUTfiORITIES RELIED ON BY APPELLANT ARE EITHER NOT IN POINT OR
REPRESENrll A .MINORITY YIE\V CONTRARY TO TFIE ESTABLIS.HED LAW OF
UTAH.
ARGUI\IENT
POINT 1.
IN OWNING, :MAINTAINING AND OPERATING THE \VALL A VENUE COMJ\fUNITY
CENTER THE RI1JSPONDENT CITY vVAS
FULFILLING A GOYERNl\iENTAL FUNCTION IN PROVIDING RECREATIONAL
FACILITIES, AND IS NOT LIABLE FOR
APPELLANT'S I N J URI E 'S SUFFERED
THEREIN.
Although the City ~nterposed other defenses such
as a denial of negligence or nuisance committed and a
plea of contributory negligence and assumption of risk
the City's motion 1nade at the close of the pre-trial conference and the further stipulation of facts was based
solely upon the ground that under all of the facts stipulated or offered to be proved there was no showing that
the City was engaged in a proprietary function in maintaining and operating the Con1n1unity Center, but on the
contrary under the facts as a 1natter of law the City was
fulfilling a governmental function in providing recreational facilities and is therefore not liable for appellant's
injuries suffered therein.
8
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Under Section 11-:2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
the governing bodies of municipalities have since 1923
been authorized by the Legislature to designate and set
apart for use as playgrounds, athletic fields, gymnasiums,
swimming pools, indoor recreation centers, or other recreational facilities, any lands or build,i·ngs owned by the
municipality and to equip, maintain, operate and super\'ise the same, employing such recreation directors, etc.,
as the governing body may deem proper. It is now the
settled la:w of Utah, beyond any question, that the providing of public recreational facilities by a municipality
is a governmental function where operated for the
common good of all without the element of special
corporate benefit or pecuniary profit and where the
enterprise was not in competition with private business or
was one which could not likely be operated as successfully in private ownership as in municipal ownership.
It is equally well settled by the law of Utah that municipalities, when acting ]n furtherance of their governmental functions, are immune from suit and are not liable
for damages which 1nay be caused by the negligence or
nuisance committed by their officers or employees.
Davis v. Provo City Corporation, ______ Utah ______ ,
265 Pac. 2d 415;
Alder v. Salt Lake City, 64 Utah 568, 231 Pac.
1102;
Husband v. Salt Lake City, 92 Utah 449, 69 Pac.
2d 491.

It is perhaps proper to ohserve at this point that the
burden is on the plaintiff-appellant to allege and prove
that the operation of the facility in question is conducted
in a proprietary and not a govern1nental capacity.

9
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Orlando v. City of Brockton, (~la~~-, 193G), 3 N.E.
2d 794;
Lenrieux v. City of St. Albans, 28 Atl. 2d 37:3;
Huff1nan v. City of Columbus, (Ohio, l:J-t-:3), 51
N.E. 2d 410.
The tests as announced in the Alder and Davis CasP~,
·supra, are (1) whether the act or operation is for the
co1nmon good of all, without the element of special eorporate benefit or pecuniary profit, and (2) whether the
enterprise was in competition \vith priva:te business and
one which would likely be operated as successfully in
private ownership as in municipal ownership.
In the Davis case, supra, the Court clearly announces
that the great weight of judicial authority is that the
maintenance of facilities for recreation is a public and
governmental function, inasmuch as parks and playgrounds are generally not operated by private corporations and there appears to have developed some duty on
the part of the City to provide for parks and playgrounds. It is obvious that. the same is equally true of a
community recreational renter operated by the city for
the unrestricted use and benefit of all the public equally.
The law make·s no distinction between indoor recreational
facilities such as ping pong, checkers or basketball and
outdoor recreational facilities such as coasting or running or reclining on the green grass of a park.
It is clearly established that if the primary purpose
of any operation is governmental in nature, the fact
that the city may charge smne small admission or derive
some incidental benefit or income therefrom does not
change the operation to a proprietary function. As this
court very properly said In the cases of

10
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Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 Pac.
443,
and
Griffin v.
2d 156,

~alt

Lake City, 111 Utah 94, 176 Pac.

the 1uere fact that a fee is exacted or a charge made
is not conclusive against the City.
Under the undisputed facts in thi~ case, it is very
clear that there is no evidence that the City was engaged
in a proprietary function, but on the contrary the evidence establishes the City was engaged in a governmental
function. It is agreed that frmn 1946 to the present time
the Center has always been operated '• as a public recreational center, and all persons have had full leave and
license to use the same at their wish and convenience as a
public park or recreational facility, and the same has
never been closed to anyone." It is agreed that the City
for approximately five ( 5) years prior to the accident
had never charged and had never received one
single dollar for use of this facility, as shown by
Exhibit 1. At the sante time the City as shown by Exhibit 1 was spending many thousands of dollars annually
to maintain the Center tor the recreation of the public.
Even while the same was leased to the U.'S.O. for the
recreation of the military, the City was making some contributions to the maintenance of this facility as a public
service. See answer to Interrogatory 15 (R. 024). It is
not shown that even years before the accident the City
received any income or rental from the U.S.O. The only
money the City ever received was in 1946 and the fore11
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part of 19-17 when a very small return \vas received from
the snack bar concession. However, it is clear that these
receipts are so remote in ti1ne that they can have no bearing on the nature of the operation on the date of the aeeident some five ( 5) years or n1ore later.
To apply the tests announced by this Court then,
it should be very obvious indeed that under the undisputed facts the City wa~ rnaintaining and operating the
prenrises for the cornrnon good of all without the element
of special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit and it is
equally obvious that this enterprise was not in competition with private business and clearly was not one which
could likely be operated as successfully in private ownership as in rnunicipal ownership. What private business
ever has or could operdte a recreational or amusernent
center over a period of five ( 5) years without any return
whatsoever and without attempting to get any return
while it was spending an average of approximately $6,500.00 each year in the nlaintenance and operation of the
center~ This is no business enterprise under any stretch
of the irnagination. It is lOOo/o governmental and philanthropic and absolutely without any purpose of corporate benefit or pecuniary profit. Even a private philanthropic institution rarely is able to make a free facility
available indefinitely at an annual cost of $6,500.00,
and any business which attempted it would be in
bankruptcy forthwith. Such a function could not be
operated successfully in private ownership or as a private
business for profit.
Appellant in her brief argues that because no official action was taken by the City to assume and exercise actual control over the day-to-day operation of the

12
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Community Center it could not have been acting in a
governmental capacity and had to be acting in a proprietary capacity and refers to the provision of the
Council-J\lanager Charter of Ogden City providing that
the powers of the City shall be exercised as prescribed
by the Charter, or if not as therein prescribed, then as
prescribed by ordinance. This argument seems utterly
irrelevant. It could be applied with equal force in arguing that the City had to be acting in a governmental
capacit:~. In effect it says that because the City did not
act at all it was acting in a proprietary capacity. If it did
not act at all, it, of course, was not acting in either a
governmental or proprietary function and it would not,
of course, be responsible for any independent acts done
either by an unofficial board of directors elected by the
public or by the acts of an officer beyond the scope of his
authority.
In this connection perhaps a word or two should be
said about the unofficial board of directors. It must be
remembered that it was elected by members of the public
using the Center and that there are no minutes of the
City Comrnission or later of the City Council authorizing
its election or authorizing any delegation of municipal
power to this board. It is apparent from all of the facts
that what happened was that the City upon making this
recreational facility available to the general public determined that it could spend so much money to maintain
and heat the building, etc., and to hire a director of recreational activities, and that the citizens in the area then
decided to organize in a cooperative way to assist in outlining the recreational program and to provide themselves with supplementary recreational facilities which

13
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the City did not furnish, such as checkers and ping pong
games. It is apparent that Commissioner East gave the
citizens so organized rather full latitude in the wa~' tlH'Y
used the facilities which the City made available to the
public. After the accident when an investigation was
1nade it became apparent that they had extended their activities into various charitable and fund raising activities
for the purpose of supple1nenting the City's facilities.
All of this, however, is something which was never authorized by the governing body of the City and none of
the money raised by the citizens through their cooperative efforts was ever paid into the City Treasury. So
.far as appears none of the officers of the City had any
knowledge or infonnation of these fund raising activities.
Certainly it received none of the funds and did not
·pr.ofit therefrom in any way. The City's employee in
charge of directing recreational activity assumed to
handle the funds raised by the citizens through their
cooperative efforts, but she obviously did not consider
that they were city funds for she never paid them into
the treasury and never accounted for them to the City
until requested to do so in the investigation of this accident. It should also be noted that there is no showing
whatsoever in this case that any person had to pay admission to use the facilities of the Wall Avenue Community
Center, and particularly the ladies powder room therein.
It may be that reservations of certain parts of the building were made for certain organizations, but there is no
showing that such reservations gave exclusive occupancy
thereof to the person or organization which reserved it.
In fact- as near as can be ascertained the reservation of a
po-rtion of the hall by a particular organization was com-
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parable to a reservation of a certain section or certain
tables of a park for a particular organization or family.
rrhese reservations help to prevent congestion in having
multiple recreational activities which might overload the
capacity of the facility, but such reservations can confer
no right to the exclusive use of a public recreational
facility any more than the grant of a right to conduct
a public parade on a public street could give the private
grantees the right to exclude others entirely from the
public street.
The fact that the Havana Club may have charged or
intended to charge admission to the dance which it was
sponsoring at the Center is equally irrelevant. That was
the act of the Havana Club and not of the City and the
City neither received nor intended to receive any of the
money. Apparently the purpose in charging admissions
was to defray the cost of the orchestra, etc., but even if
the Havana Club hoped to make a profit, that would not
affect the character of the City's operation any more than
the maintenance of Liberty Park would be converted into
a proprietary function because some church conducted
a fund raising picnic on the park for its own purposes.
One might as well say that the City constructs and repairs streets in the exercise of a proprietary function
merely because it grants a license to a farmer to peddle
vegetables on the street. The argument nmde in this
case is equally unsound and illogical.
Even if the City should be charged with responsibility for the acts of the unofficial cooperative board of
director~ or of the Havana Club in charging admissions
to its dance, still it is entirely obvious that the overall
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picture is one of a governn1ental rather than a proprietary function. The anwunts received and expended by
the citizens cooperative group were insignificant as compared with the an1ounts which the City itself spent in the
maintenance of the Center as a public recreational facility, so that it is abundantly apparent that the City's
operation was for the cornmon good without the element
of special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit and was
an enterprise clearly not in con1petition with any private
business or one which could likely be operated as successfully in private ownership as in public ownership.
As has above been indicated, the rece,ipt of some incidental income is in1material where the primary purpose
is governmental. In
l{ilbourn v. Oity of Seattle, (Wash.,-1953), 261
Pac. 2d 407,
It was h~ld that the granting by the City of a conecssion
to operate a refreshn1ent stand in a city for a percentage
of the gross profits, under which the City received $40,000.00, and which was rnerely incidental to the primary
park purpose where the annual operating cost was more
than a 1nillion dollars, did not n1ake the operation a proprietary function. In
Orlando v. City of Brockton, (Mass., 1936), 3 N.E.
2d 794,
it was held that the sale of surplus products of a city
poor farm does not change the operation to one of proprietary character and it is observed that where a comparatively insignificant income or benefit to the city
incidentally results frmn perfonnance of a public duty
the don1inating public character of the undertaking is
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not thereh~~ ehanged, and the city does not thereby become
liable for negligence of its officers or employees in the
performance of such duty. In the case of
I(elley v. Boston, 186 Mass. 165, 71 N.E. 299, 66
L.R..A. 4:22,

a dual function WaS inYolved. rrhe eity building housed
the \Vater department which \vas a properietary function
and other strictly governmental executive offices. It was
held that the cit~T \Vas not liable for an employee's negligence in the nmintenance of the building where the water
department paid no rent to the city, and that the fact
that the city derived an incidental gain from the water
department whose offices were housed in the building
did not convert the govermnental function of maintenance
of a public building into a proprietary function. The
prineipal purpose and function controlled.
In the case of
Wilson vs. District of Columbia 179 Fed. 2d 44,
it was held that the District of Columbia exercised a
governmental and not a proprietary function in maintaining the municipal building, a part of which it allowed
the War Department to occupy for a proportionate
share of the expenses, and part of which was also used,
rent free, for a cafeteria for the convenience of city
employees even though the proprietor of the cafeteria
was engaged in business for profit. The case at Bar is
even stronger in favor of the City's position for here
there is no showing that the City even knew that any
other organization was charging for functions held on
the. premises.
Crone vs. City of El Cajon (California), 24 Pac.
2d 846,
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the defendant eity had for several yc>ars operated a
swimming pool during the su1nn1er rnonths for the
pleasure of its citizens. A snmll fee was charged for its
use, but their total did not pa~· the cost of operation. It
was held that the charging of fees did not under the
circumstances convert the operation into one of a proprietary capacity and that the city was im1nune frmn
liability for negligence in the operation of the pool.
In the case of
Kellar vs. Oity of Los Angeles (California, 1919),
178 Pac. 505,
cited with approval by this Court in the Bttrton. case,
supra, the plaintiff, a child, paid the defendant city
$3.75 a week for board, lodging and care at the city's
summer recreation cmnp. The cru:np was conducted
pursuant to Charter power, to "establish, own, equip,
maintain, conduct and operate ..... parks, playgrounds,
gymnasiu1ns ..... and also any and all buildings .....
which are necessary or convenient to the health, morals,
education or wealfare of the inhahitants of the city, or
for their mnusement, recreation, entertain1nent or benefit". While at the camp the plaintiff was injured and
he sued the city alleging negligence. The California
Supreme Court held that children's recreation centers
maintained by a city for the general use of the children
of the city, where so conducted as to partake in no degree of the nature of a private business, do not differ
substantially from a public park, and second, that the
small charge 1nade to help defray the costs does not
change the character of the operation which is one of a
governmental function.
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Again the case of
Day vs. City of Berlin 157 Fed 2d 323,
particularly interesting here. It was there held that
a ejty maintaining in its city hall a women's lounge and
lavoratory, in which there were one free and two pay
toilets, was engaged in a public or governmental function, and was not liable to one injured on her way to the
lounge intending to use a pay toilet. r:J~he following cases
also support the general proposition here advanced:
1;:;

Prickett vs. City of Hillsboro (Illinois), 55 N.E.
2d 306;
Gebhardt vs. Village of LaGrange Park (Ill
inois), 188 N.E. 372;
Johnson vs. Board of Road
(Michigan), 235 N. vV. 221;

Commiss,ioners

Beakey vs. Town of Bellirica (Mass.), 85 N.E.
2d 620;
Curran vs. Boston 24 N.E. 781; 8 L.R.A. 243;
Rome vs. London and Lancaster Indemnity
Co. 156 Southern 64; 169 Southern 132;
Fournier vs. City of Berlin (Vermont), 26 Atl.
:2d 366, 1-±0 A.L.R. 1045;
~'I organ

vs. Shelbyville 121 S.W. 617;

Hannon vs. Waterbury (Connecticutt) 136 Atl.
876; 57 A.L.R. 402;
Wold vs. Portland 112 Pac. 2d 469; 133 A.L.R.
1207.
It is respectfully submitted that on this record there
is no proof that the Respondent Ogden City was engaged in a proprietary function. The evidence con-
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elusively shows the city was engaged in a govern1nental
function. The city therefore not liable in this action and
the j:udg1nent of. the Cou~t was proper and should be
affirmed.
POINT 2.
THE CITY DID NOT LEASE
TO ANYONE.

~rHE

PREMISES

The appellant in the forepart of her brief argues
that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between
Ogden City and the I-Iavana Club and attempts to
predicate liability on that claimed relationship. This
arguement fails to hold water for several reasons, the
first of which was that there was no such landlordtenant relationship. The City did not lease the premises
to the I--Iavana Club or to anyone else. True, the mernbers of the Havana Club had the right to use a portion
of the premises that evening for a public dance, but the
right to use the premisis they enjoyed independent of
any lease with all other men1bers of the public, and not
as lessee.
Furthermore, there is absolutely no showing that
the en1ployee of the City at the premises, the Director
of Recreational Activities, had any authority in behalf
of the City to lease the premises to the Havana Club or
to anyone else. Her .duties under the agreed record were
merely to direct recreational activities. Even if her
action in granting license and permission to the Havana
Club to conduct a dance in the south wing of the preInises were to be construed as a lease, the act was entirely beyond the scope of her authority and no landlordtenant relationship between the City and the Havana
20
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Cluh could be predicated thereon. Again her action in
granting the HaYana Club permission or license to use
the premisi::; for a dance was not a lease. A lease is "a
8IJecies of eontrad for the possession and profits of
tand:-; and tenements either for life or for a certain period of time, or during the pleasure of the parties".
H;mYiPr's Law Dictionary.
As indicated, Ogden City could enter into a contract
only through its governing body and there is no evidence
that it did so. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to show that possession of any part of the premises
rather than mere permssion to enter and use the same
ns members of the public was here involved.
llloreover, the arrangement was obviously made not
for the use or benefit of the City but for the benefit of
the independent cooperative group of citizens represented by tLe unofficial board of directors for it is agreed that the money contributed by the Havana Club
on the occasion was expended under their direction. The
City received no consideration at all for the claimed
lease contract. One could as logically contend that New
York City operates the Brooklyn Bridge in a proprietary capacity because a con-man sold the bridge to a
visiting innocent.
POINT 3.
EYEN IF THE crrY HAD LEASED THE
PREMISES, STILL JT IS NOT LIABLE, AS
IT \Y AS, NEVERTHELESS, FULFILLING A
GOVERN~fENT.AL FUNCTION.
In her a.rgu1nent that the claimed relationship of
landlord and tenant removes governmental immunity
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enjoyed by n1unicipalities in Utah, as elsewhere, from
this kind of an action, the appellant cites and relies on
the cases of
Davis vs. Provo City and Brigham Young University (Utah), 265 Pac. 2d 415;
Lowe vs. Salt Lake City 13 Utah 91,44 Pac.
1050;
Pincock vs. McCoy (Idaho') 281 Pac. 371;
Lunt vs. Post Printing and Publishing Con1pany
110 Pac. 203;
Harris vs. City of Bremerton 147 Pac. 638;
Burbidge vs. Utah Light and Traction Company
211Pac. 691.
None of these cases are in point. In none of these cases,
except the Davis case, was the· defense of governmental
immunity raised or discussed and indeed in several of
them no governmental unit was involved. In the Davis
case the language quoted and relied on by the appellant
here was used by this court only with respect to the
claimed liability of the defendant Brigham Young University and was restricted to that application. The question of the landlord-tenant relationship between the University and Provo City was not involved at all in the
court's discussion of the governmental immunity of that
City and the case thereof does not support the appellant's argument.
Moreover, in none of the other cases was there any
defense of governmental immunity interposed and those
points were not considered by the courts in any way.
It is, of course, a general rule recognized by this court
that a case in which a particular point is not raised or
considered by the court is not authority for a point
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which perhaps could have been raised. See
:21 CJS "Courts", Section 209, Page 380.
In the l\lassachusetts case of

Worden vs. New Bedford -±1 American Reports
185,
the defendant city was actually engaged in renting
rooms in its city hall for profit and for activities which
had no relationsrip whatsoever with municipal affairs
and wa~ collecting the rentals therefrom. The court
there very properly recognized the distinction between
governmental and proprietary activities and hold the
city under these particular facts involved to be engaged
in a proprietary activity.
_Moreover, it is to be noticed that under the agreed
facts the Havana Club was given leave to use the premises for a public dance. A dance is, of course, a proper
recreational activity. gven if the City were to be held to
have leased the pren1ises to the Havana Club for this
particular purpose it would be a proper exercise of its
governmental function in that it may use such agencies
and procedures for the accomplishment of its governmental recreation purpobe and the occasional charging
of a small fee does not make the activity proprietary
as has been shown by the authorities hereinbefore cited.
The activity was still one for public recreation and the
City's part therein was still a governmental function
even if it had leased the premises to the Havana Club
(which it did not) and even if it had received a consideration for such lease (which it did not).
In this connection it should be recalled that there is
nothing in the record to show that the Havana Club

23
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

intended to operate its dance for other than purely recreational purposes or that it had the Inaking money as
even a seco?dary purpose in sponsoring the public dance
in question. It, of course, had no right to any governmental immunity for itself, but if it is to be assumed
that it was acting as an agency of or for the City, then
the function was govern1nental and the City was immune.
It n1ust also be carefully noted that the arrangement
with the Havana Club, whatever its character, did not
in any way involve the powder roon1 in the north wing,
the place where the accident happined. The powder
room was always available without charge to all members of the public, and those coming to attend the dance
sponsored by the Havana Club had access thereto as
members of the public and not by reason of any arrangement with the Havana Club. This is 1nade abundantly
clear from the fact that the appellant went directly to
the powder room without ever having purchased any
ticket from the Havana Club or made any other arrangements with it. (Dep. 6 and 7)
In any event the occasional leasing of the south
wing could not in any wDy convert the overall operation
of the ·Community Center, and especially the operation
of the powder romn in the north wing, into a proprietary
function. The cases cited under Point 1 of this brief
make that abundantly clear. The City is not liable and
the judgment of dismissal was properly entered.
POINT 4.
THE CITY WAS NOT F·ULFILLING A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION AS TO APPELLANT.
The appellant in her brief argues that even though
the operation of the Cmnrnunity Center was a govern24
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mental function in general, it was proprietary as to appellant at the time and place and under the circumstances of the appellant's injuries. It is submitted that
this argument has no valid basis either in fact or in law.
Under the agreed facts the appellant was not
engaged in any business transaction with the City. At
the time in question she paid the City nothing for the
use of any of the City's facilities and did not contemplate paying the City anything for the use of those
facilities either in the powder room or elsewhere. She
entered the premises as of right as any other member
of the public could have done to use the comfort and
recreational facilities which the City nmde available to
the public as a governmental function. Under her own
sworn testimoney she knew that she was absolutely
free to do so.
From the facts it is apparent that the City's role
in the maintenance of the Community Center was indivisible. It was at a cost of $6,000.00 or $7,000.00 a year
maintaining a public recreational facility for which it
charged and received absolutely nothing. The City
carried on no other function on the premises in question.
Its relationship with the plaintiff-appellant was the
same as with every other inhabitant, namely it was a
sovereign exercising a governmental function for the
health and general welfare of its inhabitants.
Under the Utah cases and the cases from other
jurisdictions hereinbefore cited it is apparent that the
great weight of authority is that the test of a governmental as against a proprietary function is "what is the
principal purpose of the activity involvd", The fact
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that the City may charge admission or derive other
incidental income is immaterial if the principal purpose
is governmental. This, we believe, is the general rule.
Under this rule it is clear that with respect to the
plaintiff, as with respect to other inhabitants, the City
was acting in its governmental capacity and that this
would be true even if it should be considered, by some
stretch of the imagination, that the City derived an
incidental benefit from the activities of the unofficial
board of directors or of the Havana Club in raising
money by various devices to furnish to the inhabitants
supplmnentary recreational facilities such as checkers,
ping ping games, etc. It can, of course, be assumed that
anything that benefits the inhabitants of the City
benefits the City itself, but that is not a benefit in the
City's corporate or proprietary capacity and these incidental benefits could not under the law change the
City's function as regards the plaintiff who, at the time
she was injured, had not yet even entered upon the
activities conducted by th Havana Club or the unofficial board of directors.
The primary purpose of the City's activity controls,
and the function is either governmental or proprietary
as determined by this primary purpose. In this case the
primary purpose of the City is clearly governmental as
to the applicant as well as to all other inhabitants.
Among the cases heretofore cited, which are particularly
cogent in this consideration, are the cases of Orlamdo
vs. the City Brockton; Beakey vs. Town of Bellirica;
Keller vs. City of Los Angeles, and Day vs. City of
Berlin, supra.
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POINT 5.
THE AUTHORITIES RELIED ON BY APPELLANT ARE EITHER NOT IN POINT OR
REPRESENT A MINORITY VIEW CONTRARY TO THE ESTABLISHED LAW OF
UTAH.
Some of the authorities relied on by the appellant
here have already been distinguished in the discussion
under Point 3 of this brief. It is respondent's conviction that the other authorities cited by appellant are
equally distinguishable. In the California cases cited
by the appellant,
Rhodes vs. City of Palo Alto 223 Pac. 2d 639 ;
Sanders vs. City of Long Beach 129 Pac. 2d 511,
and
Chafor vs. City of Long Beach 163 Pac. 670,
California Statutes are involved which apparently to
some extent remo~-e governmental immunity from the
cities. The Chafor case was apparently decided before
the 'California .l\runicipal Liability Act in question, but
in that case the California Court concluded that a
"public assen1bly and convention hall" constructed under
statute authorizing cities to contruct and maintain such
halls, which further provided that money derived from
use or hire should deposited in the treasury to the credit
of a public hall fund and any surplus might be used for
general municipal purposes, was not a building maintained for a governmental purpose. This is quite.
another thing from holding that a community recreation center is not maintained for a governmental purpose and the decision of the California Court as to
the convention hall seems proper under the facts there
which are not the facts here.
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The purpose was different. It is co1n1non knowledge that
municipal convention halls are used generally for business and "Chatnber of Commerce" promotions primarily and to attract conventions and resultant business
to the city. It is apparent too that the hall was there
constructed for hire which is contrary to the fact here.
The Chafor case is not in point.
. The Rhodes case follows the Chafor case and
applies the sa1ne doctrine of a convention or Ineeting hall
to a community theater. Declining to find as a fact that
the community theater was a recreational facility the
court con1mented that "no matter where located nor by
what agency ad1ninistered the building r.etains its essential quality as a public meet·ing place." It is no different in that respect from the Long Beach Auditorium
in the Chafor case. In the case at Bar, of course, the
stipulated facts are that the Community Center is a
recreational facility and in the Davis case and other
Utah cases cited, Utah is firmly committed to the doctrine· that public recreation is a governmental function.
The Sanders case was another municipal auditorium case and not a case of a recreational facility. The
last two cases, moreover, were decided under the Municipal Liability Law of California. Although it is not
clear it .must be canfessed that the court in those coses
particularly considered the significance of the Act.
The case of
Engles vs. New York 6 N.Y. Supplement 2d 436,
relied on by appellant likewise is not in point. In that
case the city itself was charging and receiving substantial sums arid these charges included a charge for the
hospital care of the patient whom the plaintiff was visit2~
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ing. .Jloreover, the city received some $100,000.00
revenue from the hospital facility which was not merely
incidental to the operation but was an essential and
integral part of the operation of the hospital asa whole.
[n the case at Bar the City has charged and received
absolutely nothing. Even if the Engles case were not
distinguishable, it is against the great weight of authority as disclosed by the decisions cited in the first section
of this brief.
The Utah cases of Burton vs. Salt Lake City and
Griffin vs. Salt Lake Oi.ty, also cited by appellant, are
clearly not in point here. The Burton case was decided
on pleadings which with great thoroughness and particularity alleged that the defendant city was. there in a
proprietary function for profit and in competition with
private business and in a business of a nature which
could just as easily have been successfully conducted
by private enterprise. In the case at bar the agreed facts
show that the city operated a free public recreational
facility without charge and which was a facility of a
kind which was not in competition with private business
and could not be successfully carried on as a private
business in the same manner as it was carried on by the
City.
In the Griffin case the City charged more than a
nominal price for admission; State and Federal tax was
paid on admission; no one could get in except by paying
and a net operating profit was made. The facts of that
case clearly are entirely different from the one at Bar.
In fact, none of the elements existing in the Griffin case
exist in the case at Bar.
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CONCLUSION

It is submitted that under the agreed facts the
City of Ogden in this case was, as a n1atter of law, engaged in the governmental function of providing public
recreation and that as such it is immune frmn suit for
the negligence or nuisance, if any, cmnmitted by its
officers or agents. It follows therefore that the judgment of the trial court that appellant has no cause of
action against the respondent city should be affirrned.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL THATCHER
JACK .li. RICHARDS
D. A. ALSUP
Attorneys for Respondent
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